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OPENING THE MACHINERY OF PRIVATE ORDER: PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A FORM OF PRIVATE ORDERING 
BRYAN H. DRUZIN* 
ABSTRACT 
Does legal order always need the enforcement power of the State? The 
concept of private order says no. Private ordering is traditionally defined as the 
coming together of non-governmental parties in voluntary, self-enforcing 
arrangements. This Article radically expands the concept of private order to 
include not only individuals, but also governments themselves, arguing that the 
ingredients for private ordering exist in both spheres. State actors, perhaps 
even more so than individuals, are producers of private order in that they 
regularly establish sophisticated legal order in the absence of centralized 
enforcement. The Article constructs a theory of private order which focuses on 
the unique structural properties of contract, and then applies this to the 
emergence of public international law, arguing that successful treaty-based law 
should be thought of as a form of contract-based private ordering—one able to 
emerge because it assigns ongoing positive obligations between parties thereby 
facilitating signaling. 
  
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Some of what is posited 
here regarding the impact of positive obligations upon systems of self-regulating cooperation 
evolved from a section of an earlier paper published at Georgetown University. See Bryan H. 
Druzin, Law Without The State: The Theory Of High Engagement and the Emergence of 
Spontaneous Legal Order within Commercial Systems, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 559 (2010). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Does legal order always need the enforcement power of the State? This 
Article says no. The received wisdom from Hobbes is that contracts “without 
the sword are but words . . . of no strength.”1 Indeed, this is a very common 
assumption, but it is not true. The sword is not always necessary. Most 
contracts are fulfilled without ever having to go to court not because of any 
threats of force but because they are mutually advantageous.2 In fact, research 
shows that the vast majority of business transactions are executed without 
entering into formal contracts of any kind.3 This fact gives rise to a very 
important question: to what extent is the State even necessary to establish legal 
order?4 The idea that such order can evolve without the State is sometimes 
referred to as private ordering—the coming together of non-governmental 
parties in voluntary, self-enforcing arrangements.5 Private order, as I define it 
 
 1. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 125 (A.P. Martinich ed., 2002) (1651). 
 2. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 81 (1984). Indeed, “Private mechanisms generate 
some degree of contract compliance.” JEFFREY A. MIRON, LIBERTARIANISM FROM A TO Z 70 
(2010). See also BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 12 (1990). For some early 
examinations of self-enforcing agreements, see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of 
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981); L. G. 
Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27, 27 (1980). 
 3. See Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 62 (1963); See also AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS 25 
(2007); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 
19 J. LEG. PLURALISM 1, 2 (1981). 
 4. The term legal order is used here to describe any system where parties follow a 
collectively-recognized set of rules, even where it may not always be in their interests (at least in 
the short-term) to do so. When the term “law” is used here, it is meant as also encompassing 
informal regulation—it is law not merely in the formal judicial sense, but also the broad 
regulatory sense, even without any authoritative pronouncement of these rules or formal 
enforcement of them. Some may take issue with such a loose definition, but the skeptical reader is 
urged to read on. 
 5. The term private ordering is appropriate here in that it has been used in the sense of 
private enforcement, albeit in slightly different ways. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 163–68 (1985) (making the case that repeated play and 
reputation are ‘private ordering’ tools for enforcement); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 
(1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
though Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1782 (2001) (using the term 
“private ordering” to refer to private enforcement). In recent decades, the idea of private ordering 
has attracted considerable attention in the law and economics literature. Some of the main earlier 
contributions in this vein include: ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 9–11 (1991); 
Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New Guinea, 25 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 759, 759 (1991); Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1745, 1745 (1996); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private 
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597 (1995). For an informative examination of the concept 
of private ordering and the related literature in economics, see Oliver E. Williamson, Credible 
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here, is any self-sustaining system of legal order that arises in the absence of 
external coercion. This kind of legal ordering is not promulgated and handed 
down from above but rather is produced by the participants themselves.6 
This Article radically expands the definition of private order (probably not 
without controversy) to include state actors themselves, for they too, perhaps 
even more so than individuals, are producers of private order in that they 
regularly establish sophisticated legal order between themselves despite the 
absence of any reliable third-party enforcement. The idea of private order is 
thus particularly relevant to the growth of public international law where there 
is no centralized coercive authority to speak of.7 Because it lacks a central 
coercive authority, order, therefore, cannot arise in any sweeping sense by 
being externally imposed. Indeed, from the perspective of states, the world 
exists within an arena of anarchy. Public international law is truly an archetype 
of private ordering—a vast system of legal order created by the participants 
themselves. In many key respects, the interactions between states mirror the 
behavior of individuals engaging in systems of private ordering. It makes little 
difference if the actor in question is an individual or a national government; all 
that is required is that they act as a single entity. When dealing with other 
states, national governments meet this criterion. The ingredients for private 
order therefore exist just as much on the State as on the individual level, and as 
such, the concept of private order may be applied to the emergence of public 
international law. Doing so may prove very useful: it can explain how self-
sustaining legal order is able to arise between nations despite the absence of 
any supranational authority capable of enforcing the rules on the international 
stage. Moreover, it may even suggest a way to possibly bolster the emergence 
of this order. 
 
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520–22 (1983). 
Steven Schwarcz conceptualizes private ordering as a continuum of governmental participation in 
rulemaking, with rules adopted entirely by private actors lying at one extreme end of this 
spectrum. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 324 (2002). See 
also implicit contract theory in economics. 
 6. My definition here is perhaps more extreme than the conception of private order by 
many scholars in that my definition does not allow for the imposition of rules through 
hierarchical coercion on any level, be this a government, a warlord, corporation, or a country 
club. 
 7. The United Nations or International Court of Justice (ICJ) is yet to qualitatively meet 
this criterion. See BRETT D. SCHAEFE, CONUNDRUM: THE LIMITS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 31 (2009). For a general discussion along these lines, see 
DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 180–81 (2002). ICJ only has jurisdiction with the 
consent of the parties. Its decisions are binding yet it has no real enforcement power. As such, it 
is arguably better conceptualized as a form of arbitration rather than a court with genuine 
enforcement power. 
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That is precisely what this Article does. This Article constructs a theory of 
private order8 (performance signaling theory) based around the unique 
structural properties of contract. It then applies this to the emergence of public 
international law to help explain the evolution of stable legal order between 
governments despite the absence of an external authority capable of enforcing 
their agreements, arguing that successful treaty-based law should be thought of 
as a form of contract-based private ordering, one able to emerge primarily 
because it assigns ongoing positive obligations between the participants (state 
actors in this case). It has been widely noted that long-term contractual 
interaction is unique in that it may be self-sustaining9 even in the absence of 
third-party coercion.10 Performance signaling theory posits that this private-
 
 8. The term private order has also been referred to as spontaneous law. Spontaneous legal 
order is present in any system of order that demonstrates degrees of autonomous rule formation 
and compliance. The term “spontaneous law,” while not widely used, does appear in the 
literature. For an interesting look at the idea, see Francesco Parisi, Toward a Theory of 
Spontaneous Law, 6 CONST. POL. ECON. 211 (1995). Historically, we can see this kind of self-
ordering in the form of the medieval law merchant, and arguably many aspects of this are evident 
in the lex mercatoria as it exists today where a central legislative authority is notably absent. 
Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 
265, 270 (2003). Another example drawn from history is the Leges Marchiarum (the Law of the 
Marshes), an intricate system of criminal law related to cross-border banditry (“reiving”) that 
emerged in the Anglo-Scottish borderlands from the thirteenth to sixteenth century, which 
regulated cross-border “criminal” conduct, such as falsely declaring the value of a stolen good. 
See Peter T. Leeson, The Laws of Lawlessness, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 482 (2009). 
 9. The ability of long-term contracts to reduce opportunism and sustain stable partnerships 
has been noted by many scholars and linked to the idea that they are essentially repeated games. 
See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 225–36 (4th ed. 2004); 
GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS 3 (1995); JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR 
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 260–314 (1994); Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, 
Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); B. Douglas Bernheim 
& Debraj Ray, Collective Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 
295, 296 (1989); Joseph Farrell & Eric Maskin, Renegotiation in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES & 
ECON. BEHAV. 327 (1989); Telser, supra note 2, at 27. 
 10. One example drawn from history is that of late nineteenth-century commercial contract 
law in Taiwan where the state enforcement of contracts was absent yet nevertheless remained 
highly functional. See ROSSER H. BROCKMAN, Commercial Contract Law in Late Nineteenth-
Century Taiwan, in ESSAYS ON CHINA’S LEGAL TRADITION 76, 77, 81 (Jerome Alan Cohen et al. 
eds., 1980). See also Peter Leeson, How Important Is State Enforcement for Trade? 10 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 61, 61 (2008) (critically examining the position that state-provided contract 
enforcement is critical to trade); Peter T. Leeson, Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange, 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 162 (2008) (examining the idea that ex ante signaling can make 
widespread trade self-enforcing). This is not to deny that formal enforcement remains a more 
effective way to ensure compliance—promises are clearly more secure with a vigorous 
enforcement regime in place; however, legal order may indeed be sustained without the iron hand 
of the state. While there is an important role for the State to play in protecting and enforcing basic 
property rights, the State’s role in contract may be radically minimal compared with other areas 
of law. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
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ordering potential is implicitly related to the legal makeup of contracts—
specifically, it is bound up with the particular kind of legal obligations they 
engender. Let me explain. 
Broadly defined, legal obligations come in either one of two forms.11 By 
far, the vast majority of legal obligations are framed in the negative: one shall 
not infringe upon the property rights of the man who lives next to you; one 
shall not wantonly assault other people, and so on and so forth.12 These acts are 
what we must refrain from doing. They oblige inaction. Most do not relate to 
specific individuals but rather apply to all members of the public generally—
they are owed to everyone.13 However, legal obligations also come in a second, 
albeit less common form.14 These are positive duties owed to specific 
individuals,15 positive obligations that require one to perform some overt act or 
another—that is, what we are obliged to do. I call the first kind of legal 
obligation negative obligations and the second positive obligations.16 This 
 
PERFORMANCE 52 (1990) (discussing the vital role of public institutions in the reliable 
enforcement of property rights and contracts in the promotion of economic growth). See also 
Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal 
Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1997). This brand of legal minimalism 
forms the core of the nineteenth-century laissez-faire view of contract law. The notion of legal 
minimalism is especially prevalent among those of a libertarian bent. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974) (setting forth the classical libertarian view of the 
minimalist state). 
 11. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE FOR STUDENTS OF THE 
COMMON LAW 56–57 (1896). 
 12. JOHN FORGE, THE RESPONSIBLE SCIENTIST 236 (2008). 
 13. PATRICIA SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION 8 (1998). 
 14. JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 355 (2005) (“[T]here are very few positive moral obligations imposed on us. This 
is also the case as far as the law is concerned. Thus it is rare that individuals are required to 
positively do an act (as opposed to refraining from engaging in conduct) . . . .”). 
 15. Some positive duties are not owed to specific individuals. For example, the legal 
obligation to pay one’s taxes or the obligation to scoop up after one’s dog in the park. However, 
the vast majority of positive legal obligations are owed to a particular party. It is this kind of 
positive duty that is meant here. In contracts, positive obligations always come in this form. 
 16. Two important points should be made here. First, when the term positive obligation is 
used henceforth, it is meant to connote obligations owed to specific parties. Second, the present 
notion of positive and negative obligations should not be confused with the concept of a positive 
duty of care. A positive obligation is different than a positive duty of care in that it always 
requires an overt act. A positive duty of care owed to another may not always require that an 
action be performed. For example, if we say that an employer owes a positive duty of care to his 
employees to provide safe working conditions, this may or may not be a positive obligation as it 
is meant here. This is very much situational: if in order to satisfy this duty the employer must 
actively perform something (for example, have ice removed daily from the loading dock) then it 
is a positive obligation because it demands some overt action to be taken. If, however, the 
employer need only, for example, not douse the loading dock with water on a cold day, then this 
is not a positive obligation; it is a negative obligation because it requires inaction as opposed to 
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second brand of legal obligation is special17 because the overt performance of 
an act creates a clear and discrete signal of cooperation and this maximizes the 
potential for private ordering in that it allows parties to repeatedly signal their 
commitment to long-term cooperation.18 This is not the case with the absence 
of an action: ongoing negative obligations, which require only inaction, do not 
provide any signaling opportunity. In fact, they prevent them. 
In the context of game theory this ability to signal is key because it helps 
solve the prisoner’s dilemma (a fundamental barrier to cooperation where 
external enforcement mechanisms are lacking) by generating, through repeated 
signaling, what I term signal-induced trust. Signal-induced trust is trust that 
arises between two parties from the successful and repeated communication of 
their mutual intention to cooperate. The distinction between negative and 
positive obligations is therefore critical because it affects the ability to signal. 
Ongoing positive obligations allow for clear and frequent cooperation 
signaling and this has implications for private ordering on all levels: from the 
interactions of individuals to that of national governments. Here we have the 
building blocks for a theory that may help explain the emergence of public 
international law. Given sufficient signaling, contracts between individuals can 
sustain themselves through signal-induced trust, and in precisely the same 
fashion, given sufficient signaling, treaties between nations can sustain 
themselves through signal-induced trust.19 While the focus here is on the 
emergence of public international law, the reader should note that the theory 
could just as readily be applied to the emergence of international legal order 
between private actors, most notably commercial parties. Indeed, international 
commerce now constitutes between twenty and twenty-five percent of the 
world’s entire gross domestic product (GDP)—an impressive system of private 
 
action. The focus here is simply the nature of what is demanded: action or inaction. Negative 
obligations demand inaction; positive obligations require action. This distinction is important, as 
it also avoids the conceptual confusion that surrounds the idea of omissions and affirmative 
duties. See infra note 17. 
 17. The distinction drawn here between positive and negative obligations should not be 
confused with acts and omissions. An act is the performance of a proscribed behavior; an 
omission is the non-performance of a prescribed behavior. The difference between positive and 
negative obligations, rather, is that one requires inaction (negative obligations) and the other 
demands action (positive obligations). 
 18. Signaling has been widely studied in economics within the area of contract theory. See 
infra note 50. 
 19. For some interesting work regarding signaling between States in a much broader sense, 
see ROBERT JERVIS, THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1989) (analyzing 
state relations in terms of communications consisting of signals and indices: indices being 
“statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct 
because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor’s capabilities or intentions.”). 
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ordering that exists, like public international law, largely within a state of 
technical anarchy.20 
The Article is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the notion of private 
ordering. It then examines the prisoner’s dilemma, how it is solved by repeated 
interaction, and the emergence of signal-induced trust. Part II fleshes out the 
details of performance signaling theory, examining how exactly positive 
obligations facilitate private ordering. After laying this crucial groundwork, the 
final section, Part III, then explores at length the implications that flow from 
this theory for the past and future growth of public international law. 
Performance signaling theory may prove extremely valuable as a public 
international law theory. Empirical research would go far in bolstering the 
theory’s claims. Such research is invited. The goal here, however, is to merely 
lay out the broad strokes of the theory. The task before us is to articulate a 
general thesis that may contribute to our understanding of how private ordering 
emerges on all levels, from the private ordering of individual actors to that of 
nation-states—to open, that is, the machinery of private order and peer inside. 
I.  THE POSSIBILITY OF PRIVATE ORDER, THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA, AND 
REPEATED INTERACTION 
A. The Possibility of Private Order 
Jeremy Bentham asserted that “[p]roperty and [state] law are born and 
must die together. Before the laws, there was no property: take away the laws, 
all property ceases.”21 This legal centrist22 belief has become so ingrained in 
the popular imagination that the position has become almost axiomatic—
almost unassailable in its legitimacy. But it is not true. Game theorists, 
libertarians, anarchists, and law and economic scholars alike all postulate that 
law may evolve and function in the absence of the State.23 As Robert Cooter 
 
 20. Peter T. Leeson, Anarchy Unbound: How Much Order Can Spontaneous Order Create?, 
in HANDBOOK ON CONTEMPORARY AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 136, 141 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 2010). 
 21. JEREMY BENTHAM & JOHN BOWRING, 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 309 (1838). 
 22. For an overview of the concept of legal centrism including evidence that refutes this 
belief, see ELLICKSON, supra note 5, at 138–47. 
 23. While not a comprehensive list of scholars that deal in this concept, see ELLICKSON, 
supra note 5, at 139; F. A. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 72 (1973); Bruce L. 
Benson, Customary Law with Private Means of Resolving Disputes and Dispensing Justice: A 
Description of a Modern System of Law and Order Without State Coercion, 9 J. LIBERTARIAN 
STUD. 25 (1990); Bruce L. Benson, Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive 
Societies: Law without Government, 9 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1 (1989); Bernstein, supra note 5, 
at 115; Karen Clay, Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California, 13 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 202 (1997); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law 
Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 216 (1994); Robert C. 
Ellickson, The Aim of Order Without Law, 150 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 97, 97 
(1994); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi 
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explains, “Rather than proceeding from top to bottom, lawmaking can proceed 
from bottom to top.”24 Yet this idea stands in stark contrast to the prevailing 
view that law is to be conceived of in terms of external coercion. That this 
view is so pervasive is completely understandable, however. Indeed, the idea 
of self-enforcing legal order seems almost counter-intuitive, almost a 
contradiction. Is not the hallmark of legal order enforcement? Is the State not 
needed to prop up law? The question inevitably arises: If we remove external 
enforcement, how can order sustain itself? How will it not simply succumb to 
the stain of human self-interest and topple in on itself like a house of well-
intentioned cards? 
There is an answer. In a Hobbesian state of nature where there is no clear 
external authority to enforce agreements mutual self-interest can sustain 
cooperation.25 In place of external enforcement, Lon Fuller opines, it falls upon 
sheer self-interest to foster a recognition and protection of rights.26 In game 
theory speak: cooperation is not a zero-sum game.27 One party’s benefit does 
not have to come at the expense of the other party. Mutual benefit is possible. 
For example, every driver recognizes that there is a mutual benefit to be 
gleaned from a convention that requires everyone to drive on a specific side of 
the highway.28 This reciprocal gain is enough to ensure norm compliance—it is 
mostly self-enforcing.29 There is hardly a need for authorities to rigorously 
enforce right- or left-hand drive. 
B. The Fatal Flaw: The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
However, the problem arises in situations where this symmetry of interests 
breaks down and the incentive structure becomes skewed, specifically where a 
prisoner’s dilemma scenario emerges.30 In a prisoner’s dilemma, the fear of 
 
Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989); Rachel E. Kranton, Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-
Sustaining System, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 830 (1996); Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of 
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne 
Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990). See also DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM 159 
(2d ed. 1995); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, 1 MAN ECONOMY, AND STATE 77 (1962). 
 24. Cooter, supra note 23, at 215. 
 25. JOHN M. ALEXANDER, CAPABILITIES AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 47 (2008). 
 26. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 28 (1967). 
 27. For an interesting discussion of non-zero-sum games in relation to situations of conflict, 
see ANATOL RAPOPORT, THE ORIGINS OF VIOLENCE 518–19 (1989). 
 28. I borrow this example from ELLICKSON, supra note 5, at 159. 
 29. See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 
644, 646 (1989). 
 30. For the reader unfamiliar with game theory, McAdams provides a nice summary of the 
prisoner’s dilemma: 
[T]wo prisoners, A and B, are suspected of committing a crime together. If neither 
confesses, each knows they will each be convicted of a lesser offense and serve (say) 
three years in prison. The prosecutor then offers each the following deal, and each knows 
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betrayal causes cooperation to unravel even where cooperation is advantageous 
to both parties.31 The prisoner’s dilemma is canonical in the game theory 
literature, as it represents a seemingly intractable barrier to cooperation in 
situations where there is no third-party enforcement. It is much studied because 
this dynamic comes up in a great many situations that have the potential for 
mutually beneficial cooperation but falter due to this incentive structure, from 
pairs of individuals to countries.32 The problem is one of trust. The ever-
present specter of the other side cheating undermines the possibility of 
cooperation. In the prisoner’s dilemma the two players can either cooperate or 
defect; the dilemma is that while cooperating provides mutual benefit, no 
matter what the other does, the selfish choice of defection is always the 
smartest move.33 If the other player does not betray you, you gain the most by 
betraying them; if the other player does betray you, then you can mitigate this 
by also betraying them. Either way defection is the dominant strategy over 
cooperation, forming an equilibrium of non-cooperation (for rational actors).34 
The stain of human selfishness sabotages cooperation. This “dilemma” 
represents a significant obstacle where there is no third-party enforcement.35 
Without the sword, it is difficult for the parties to trust each other and 
cooperation breaks down. 
There is a certain irony to the prisoner’s dilemma. In the prisoner’s 
dilemma, confessing is the dominant strategy because it is the best strategy no 
matter what the other prisoner does.36 However, the reasoning is the same for 
both sides, so both end up defecting, leading to a worse outcome than if they 
 
it is offered to the other: If you confess and the other does not, we will let you off with 
only one year in prison; if the other confesses and you do not, we will punish you with ten 
years in prison; if you both confess, you both will serve five years in prison. Confessing is 
the dominant strategy because it is the best strategy no matter what the other prisoner 
does. From A’s perspective, if B confesses, A is better off confessing and getting five 
years instead of ten; if B does not confess, A is better off confessing and getting one year 
instead of three. The reasoning is the same for B. 
Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 
YALE L.J. 625, 628 n.13 (2001). The irony is that because both confess, both actors do worse than 
if they had just cooperated and kept silent. The prisoner’s dilemma is discussed in detail below. 
 31. Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390, 
1391 (1981). 
 32. Miranda Mowbray, Observable Instability for the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, in 
APPROXIMATION, OPTIMIZATION AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 223, 223 (Marc Lassonde 
ed., 2001). 
 33. Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 31, at 1391 (“[T]wo individuals can each either 
cooperate or defect. . . . No matter what the other does, the selfish choice of defection yields a 
higher payoff than cooperation.”). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Williamson, supra note 5, at 519, 537. 
 36. MARIA MOSCHANDREAS, BUSINESS ECONOMICS 172 (2d ed. 2000). 
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had just cooperated.37 Even if both parties want to cooperate, by the diktat of 
rationality, they cannot. It becomes a race to betray the other person first—a 
race to the bottom.38 For purely amoral rational actors in an isolated interaction 
there is no escape from this.39 Even two angels will be forced to become devils 
because they cannot risk trusting the other: the situation is such that it compels 
the parties into cheating because neither side can risk being the sucker.40 They 
cannot trust each other and so in their attempt to win, both parties lose. So 
where does that leave us? In a pickle it would seem, forever doomed to slip 
endlessly into mutually destructive conflict. But this is of course not what 
happens. Cooperation can emerge even in prisoner’s dilemma type situations, 
and indeed it emerges all the time. 
C. The Solution: Repetition 
The well-known solution to this dilemma, of course, is to make the 
situation an iterated game—that is, to repeat it.41 In an iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma, the value of repeated cooperation can offset short-term gain and 
prevent defection. This is because players want to keep the relationship going 
and cheating the other player in the present round will jeopardize this 
continuity by invoking retaliation.42 
1. Threat-induced Trust 
To illustrate this with a simple example: if by betraying me today you 
could earn ten dollars (but I will cease cooperating with you), or earn one 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. As Axelrod and Hamilton write, “With two individuals destined never to meet again, the 
only strategy that can be called a solution to the game is to defect always despite the seemingly 
paradoxical outcome that both do worse [when they both defect] than they could have had they 
cooperated.” Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 31, at 1391. 
 39. GEORGE J. MAILATH & LARRY SAMUELSON, REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATIONS 3 
(2006). In the case of prisoner’s dilemma games “played only once, no strategy can invade the 
strategy of pure defection. . . . [T]o defect always is an evolutionarily stable strategy.” Axelrod & 
Hamilton, supra note 31, at 1392. 
 40. The prisoner’s dilemma dynamic is in fact the reason that plea bargaining is forbidden in 
many jurisdictions, as it can potentially compel innocent parties to confess to crimes they did not 
commit. For a good discussion of this, see Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ 
(Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 737 (2009). 
 41. Much of the game theory literature addresses the principle of repeated interaction in the 
context of iterated games. I refer the reader to the foundational work regarding this idea. See 
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 
31, at 1391. See also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (James E. Alt & Douglass C. 
North eds., 1990); Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with 
Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA 533 (1986). For a good 
overview of this idea, see ELLICKSON, supra note 5, at 164. 
 42. AXELROD, supra note 41, at 126. 
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hundred dollars by cooperating with me for a week, rationality dictates that it 
is the optimum strategy to cooperate; by not doing so would rob yourself of 
ninety dollars. Importantly, because I know that you know this, I can therefore 
trust you today.43 And equally important, the same goes for you. This 
assurance of cooperation thus diffuses the self-destructive trap at the heart of 
the prisoner’s dilemma—the fear of betrayal. The force of self-interest instead 
flows towards cooperation. The trust that arises between two commercial 
parties is not really trust in the generic sense—it is that both parties “trust” that 
the other party has determined that long-term cooperation is in their own self-
interest. It is what I call rational trust.44 
If the game comprises many periods of play, conditional cooperation can 
thus emerge. This principle is an axiom among game theorists: “One-shot 
encounters encourage defection; frequent repetition encourages cooperation.”45 
Rule compliance is assured in a far more reliable way: not through the threat of 
external coercion by a government, but by the force of self-interest. Repeated 
dealings, or even the potential for repeated interaction, can thus generate stable 
cooperation strategies between parties.46 In each period of play, players can 
respond to what occurred in the previous period. Repeated interactions thus 
allow for the emergence of what game theorists call conditional cooperation.47 
The threat of retaliation ensures long-term cooperation by simply negating the 
incentive to cheat in the short term. Rational trust may emerge as a result. 
2. Signal-Induced Trust 
This is not, however, the only form of rational trust that can arise between 
two players facing a prisoner’s dilemma. Above is an example of what I will 
call threat-induced trust: both parties trust that the other will comply because 
of the threat of retaliation by the other player. This is the standard explanation 
of how the prisoner’s dilemma is solved. The dilemma in the prisoner’s 
dilemma is a mutual lack of trust that drives otherwise cooperative parties to 
cheat, creating a worse outcome. The solution is for both parties to gain 
sufficient confidence that the other party will not cheat; that is, that they have 
long-term time horizons and value long-term cooperation over short-term gain. 
The threat of retaliation provides this confidence. However, confidence that the 
 
 43. GOVERNANCE AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 69 (Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & 
David Lazer eds., 2007) (“Repeated interactions allow reciprocity, and thus trust, to emerge.”). 
 44. Where the term “trust” is used henceforth, it is meant in this sense. 
 45. MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 65 (1996). 
 46. STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD 254 (2004). 
 47. See GOVERNANCE AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 43, at 63 (discussing 
the conditional cooperation strategy of Tit-for-Tat). See also Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 
Social Norms and Human Cooperation, 8 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 185, 186 (2004) 
(presenting a nice overview of the norm of conditional cooperation). 
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other party will not cheat can arise another way as well, also as the 
consequence of repeated interactions. 
This is in the form of signal-induced trust.48 This is a less Machiavellian 
form of trust that arises slowly as the result of many rounds of the other party 
signaling that they have an interest in sustaining a long-term relationship than 
in cheating.49 Beyond providing an opportunity for retaliation, an iterated game 
provides an opportunity for communication, allowing each player to decipher 
the strategy of the other player.50 This knowledge arises simply from repeated 
experience with the other player as the parties signal their intentions to one 
another through their behavior. Signal-induced trust emerges after many 
periods of interaction—the more frequent the signaling, the more likely its 
emergence. So long as the parties repeatedly interact, they will invariably 
communicate their time horizons.51 The more times the parties run through 
discrete cycles of cooperation without incident, the more they signal and the 
 
 48. Signal-induced trust is ultimately founded upon the threat that future rounds of 
cooperation will be lost if one cheats. However, it is distinct from threat-induced trust in that once 
the other party’s strategy is confirmed there is no need to keep the ever-present threat of 
immediate retaliation. This allows for a greater degree of flexibility and sophistication in terms of 
cooperation. 
 49. Positive obligations by their very structural nature allow for signaling. The role of 
signaling has been extensively studied in economics. See In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria, 102 Q. J. ECON. 179 (1987). For a good overview of 
signaling games in relation to the prisoner’s dilemma, see PRAJIT K. DUTTA, STRATEGIES AND 
GAMES 383–402 (1999). The impact of signaling may of course be increased if it is costly—a 
dynamic known in both economics and biology as costly signaling, the basis of costly signaling 
theory (CST). While itself an important feature capable of inducing cooperation, costly signaling 
is not brought into the present analysis (though it could very well be). For CST’s economic 
embodiment, see the foundational piece Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 
355 (1973). I provide a comprehensive overview of CST elsewhere; see Bryan Druzin, Law, 
Selfishness, and Signals: An Expansion of Posner’s Signaling Theory of Social Norms, 24 CAN. 
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5, 26–27 (2011). The role of signaling in repeated games has been 
comprehensively studied both empirically and theoretically. UNCERTAINTY AND RISK 280 
(Mohammed Abdellaoui et al. eds., 2007). For a good summary of the work on signaling in the 
economics literature, see DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 645–54 
(1990). 
 50. GRAHAM KENDALL ET AL., THE ITERATED PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (2007) (outlining the 
importance of communication for producing cooperation). 
 51. That is, if they have long-term cooperation in mind. It might be argued that confidence in 
the other party’s time horizons would not develop because cooperation is merely a response to the 
threat of retaliation and not a genuine expression of the actor’s commitment to long-term 
cooperation. However, this is not the case. The actors’ time horizons will become clearer as 
situations invariably arise where retaliation is not viable and yet the other party complies, or 
where one party chooses to forego retaliation (that is, tit-for-tat with forgiveness) thereby 
expressing their commitment to long-term cooperation. The parties can intentionally test the other 
party in this fashion, giving them small opportunities to cheat etc. So long as the parties 
repeatedly interact, signaling is bound to emerge. 
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more they can reasonably have confidence that the other’s strategy is long-term 
cooperation and not short-term cheating. 
While the standard analysis of the prisoner’s dilemma rightfully focuses on 
the importance of retaliation in the case of defection, this does not provide a 
complete picture. The dilemma in the prisoner’s dilemma is just one of trust, or 
the lack of it to be more precise. If both parties can be reasonably confident the 
other will, like them, not cheat, then they can then risk cooperating. While trust 
that the other actor will comply can be achieved through threat-induced trust,52 
trust can also be achieved by ascertaining that the other party genuinely has 
long-term time horizons and will therefore not be baited into betrayal—signal-
induced form of trust (indeed, this is closer to the more conventional 
understanding of “trust”). This second kind of trust is the product of repeated 
signaling and arises when both parties’ interest in long-term cooperation has 
been reliably inferred through frequent and repeated interactions, so much so 
that the threat of immediate retaliation can be relaxed—one’s guard can be 
gradually lowered. Trust arises from familiarity with the other party’s strategy 
rather than from the crude threat of retaliation. In the case of threat-induced 
trust and signal-induced trust, both parties are placed in the same position: they 
have an ex ante basis for trust, and this solves the prisoner’s dilemma. 
It is well accepted that communication generally induces greater 
cooperative behavior between actors.53 Indeed, this is in fact the way the 
cooperative relationships of long-term commercial contracts typically unfold: 
first, conditional cooperation emerges based on a rudimentary form of threat-
induced trust, but then over a period of doing business with each other, this 
gradually evolves into signal-induced trust. Thus, for example, international 
shipping contracts typically begin with letter of credit terms only to later 
evolve into open account terms after sufficient signaling has occurred.54 Trust 
emerges from repeated cycles of interaction. Indeed, signal-induced trust is far 
closer to how we conventionally think of trust. It is closer to the trust that 
arises between individuals who have known each other on a personal level 
over many years, having repeatedly interacted with each other and thus 
deciphered the other’s time horizons. 
 
 52. This form of “trust” can be achieved through private retaliation where there is repeated 
play, or through the threat of state sanctions where there is not. 
 53. See, e.g., Chester A. Insko et al., Individual-Group Discontinuity: The Role of a 
Consensus Rule, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 505 (1988); John M. Orbell et al., 
Explaining Discussion-Induced Cooperation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811 (1988). 
Masaki Aoyagi and Guillaume Fréchette show that in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
games with imperfect public monitoring, the level of cooperation increases with the quality of the 
public signal. Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume Fréchette, Collusion as Public Monitoring Becomes 
Noisy: Experimental Evidence, 144 J. ECON. THEORY 1135 (2009). See also generally the concept 
of “noise” in the economics literature. 
 54. MAURICE D. LEVI, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 463 (4th ed. 2005). 
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While signal-induced trust is still firmly rooted in self-interest and the 
underlying threat of losing a cooperative partner,55 it is distinct from threat-
induced trust in that once the other party’s strategy is confirmed, there is less 
need for the ever-present threat of immediate retaliation and this therefore 
allows for a far greater flexibility and, crucially, more robust, sophisticated 
forms of cooperation. The difference is analogous to two strangers performing 
a cooperative act while pointing guns at each other’s heads and two people in a 
boat sailing together across an ocean. The threat of immediate retaliation is no 
longer needed because it is clear they have a reliable partnership—both parties 
have, through repeated signaling, successfully communicated their interest in 
long-term cooperation. They “trust” each other, or more precisely, they trust 
they know the other side’s strategy is one of sustained cooperation. It is a much 
slower evolution that strengthens over time through repeated interactions with 
the same party, but that once arisen can be even more effective in giving rise to 
further cooperative order, as opportunities for perfect retaliation are not always 
practical or reliably available. Because of the imperfect nature of retaliation, 
trust that the other party feels that cooperation is in their own interest is 
actually a safer bet. In fact, successful long-term contractual relationships often 
end up relying more on signal-induced trust than on threat-induced trust. 
Signal-induced trust versus threat-induced trust is a useful distinction to draw, 
as it requires slightly different conditions to arise, and once arisen, provides a 
different (greater) benefit. 
Signal-induced trust often grows out gradually from threat-induced trust 
(though this need not always be the case). Because signal-induced trust can 
only emerge after a period of sustained, frequently repeated interactions, the 
two kinds of trust are often sequential: the early stages of a cooperative 
relationship are marked by a cautious threat-induced trust; however, after a 
period of reasonable stability, signal-induced trust may emerge based on a 
growing confidence in the cooperative intentions of the other actor—that is, 
that they have long-term time horizons. However, signal-induced trust may 
also emerge without threat-induced trust. This is possible if the parties begin 
by taking small, calculated risks of trust in the initial period and gradually 
build up their cooperative relationship as signal-induced trust emerges. This is 
precisely the function of acts of good faith in contract. In the initial rounds, 
parties can avoid the prisoner’s dilemma and risk taking a leap of faith if the 
consequences of defection are relatively minor. The stakes can then be 
increased as signal-induced trust builds. Indeed, the above example of 
international shipping contracts is in fact more in line with this model, as the 
opportunity for retaliation in the initial round, even where employing 
documentary credit, is not foolproof. In this fashion, baby steps of trust with 
 
 55. But perhaps this is also true of personal relationships. 
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limited risk can, through signaling, evolve into a stable relationship. Because 
relationships based upon signal-induced trust have the advantage of far greater 
flexibility and, importantly, a reduced need to depend upon the constant threat 
of retaliation, it is indeed a powerful engine for private ordering. 
In contrast to negative obligations, positive obligations foster cooperation 
in that they naturally facilitate signaling and thus solve the prisoner’s dilemma 
by producing signal-induced trust.56 The section that follows will examine how 
exactly this occurs, mapping out the theoretical heart of performance signaling 
theory. 
II.  PERFORMANCE SIGNALING THEORY: HOW POSITIVE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
FACILITATE PRIVATE ORDERING 
A. Distinguishing Between Positive and Negative Obligations 
Any situation that is mutually advantageous and where there is sufficient 
repetition between the same players can generate private order.57 We often see 
this ordering in the case of small homogenous groups.58 This is because a small 
group is essentially an iterated game in that it allows for repeated interactions 
with the same players.59 This repetition can generate rational trust—both 
threat-induced and signal-induced. Indeed, tight-knit small communities 
demonstrate high levels of signal-induced trust; threat-induced trust is really of 
secondary importance. Players know who are and who are not long-term 
cooperators. However, as group size increases, and there is less or no repeated 
interaction, the possibility of any kind of trust fades, both threat-induced and 
 
 56. Trust solves a wide variety of games, the prisoner’s dilemma being but one of these. 
However, the prisoner’s dilemma is the focus here, as it pinpoints the problem underlying human 
cooperation (a lack of trust) along with its solution. KEN BINMORE, RATIONAL DECISIONS 27 
(Richard Blundell ed., 2009). 
 57. GOVERNANCE AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 43, at 65; LEADING EDGES 
IN SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 222 (R. Duncan Luce et al. eds., 1989). 
 58. This has been written on extensively. See ELLICKSON, supra note 5; Bernstein, supra 
note 5; Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Clay, supra note 23; David 
Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 
(1979); Greif, supra note 23; Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman 
Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981); Richard O. 
Zerbe Jr. & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in the 
California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114 (2001). 
 59. There is also the element of reputational costs in small groups; however, this is not dealt 
with directly here. The effectiveness of any repeated game, however, is in fact based upon 
reputation even if this is only in the limited sense of one’s reputation from preceding rounds of 
play. Reputational costs can be thought of as a form of vicarious retaliation. 
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signal-induced.60 This is because in very large N-person prisoner’s dilemmas,61 
actors turn into one-shot players, precluding both retaliation and signaling,62 
and so state-enforced law is necessary to change the incentive structure and 
prevent cheating. 
As pointed out, based on whether they require action or inaction, we can 
distinguish between two types of legal obligations: negative and positive 
obligations.63 Between these two, ongoing positive obligations are unique 
 
 60. ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF CULTURES 146 
(2005); Andreas Diekmann & Klaus Manhart, Cooperation in 2- and N-Person Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Games: A Simulation Study, 11 ANALYSE & KRITIK 134, 134 (1989) (translated version 
available at http://www.klaus-manhart.de/mediapool/28/284587/data/07-nperson-pd.pdf). Indeed, 
group size has been an important feature of game theory research and one that has been much 
studied. Research shows that cooperation decreases in large groups. See David De Cremer & 
Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Cooperation in Social Dilemmas and the Need to Belong: The 
Moderating Effect of Group Size, 7 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY RES. & PRAC. 168 (2003); 
Norbert L. Kerr, Illusions of Efficacy: The Effects of Group Size on Perceived Efficacy in Social 
Dilemmas, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 287 (1989); Wim B.G. Liebrand, The Effect of 
Social Motives, Communication and Group Size on Behaviour in an N-person Multi-stage Mixed-
motive Game, 14 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 239 (1984). 
 61. N-person prisoner’s dilemmas are games that involve more than two players. For a more 
detailed discussion, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 169 (1982). 
 62. Indeed, this creates the “tragedy of the commons” described by Hardin in which the 
players are worse off following the rational dictates of their self interests than if they coordinated 
their actions. Actors are driven to do so even when it is clear that it is not in anyone’s long-term 
interest for this to happen. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1248 
(1968). See also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). 
 63. We should take care to not be confused by mere semantics. One can frame negative 
obligations so as to appear positive in nature. For example, rather than saying one must not drive 
forward at a red light, this could be recast as one must remain stopped at a red light (the act of 
remaining stopped being a positive act). Yet there remains a fundamental difference between the 
two types of legal obligations in the way they are satisfied: a negative obligation is satisfied by 
inaction, “by ‘sitting on one’s hands.’” JOHN C.W. TOUCHIE, HAYEK AND HUMAN RIGHTS 154 
(2005). A negative obligation requires that the actor not do a specific act. The actor can do an 
endless array of other acts; however, the act stipulated by the negative obligation is not to be 
performed. Thus, in regards to the proscribed act, the actor can comply by inaction. A positive 
obligation, by contrast, requires a specific kind of action in order for there to be compliance. If a 
specific overt act of some kind is demanded, then it is a positive obligation; if no overt act is 
demanded, then it is a negative obligation. However, in some unique situations it may not simply 
be a matter of “sitting on one’s hands” in that a negative obligation may in fact require the 
performance of some supporting positive act. For example: “Do not go through a red light” 
requires inaction. It is a negative obligation—”Do not do X.” However, if you are driving a car 
speeding towards a red light, in order to not go through the red light, you will have to press on the 
brakes, gear down, etc., all of which are positive actions. However—and this is a key point—
while not doing X may in some unique situations actually require a positive action to achieve this 
goal of non-occurrence, the end result is still that X is not performed—X does not occur. This is 
important because the doing of X is what constitutes the signal. Even if positive actions are 
needed behind the scenes to achieve the inaction of not doing X, no signaling occurs because the 
other party will usually never know any of this even occurred. 
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because they create repeated signaling opportunities that generate signal-
induced trust—the overt performance of an act comprises a signal. The 
difference between positive and negative obligations is perhaps most clear in 
the case of contract. The types of action required by contract and other areas of 
law are in effect polar opposites. In contractual law, participants are actively 
doing something with specific partners as opposed to merely refraining from 
doing something with non-specific partners. This difference is significant. 
Contract regulates what people are obliged to do in addition to what they 
should not do. Other areas of law are mostly framed merely in the negative—it 
is what one must not do.64 
The simplicity of this observation should not be confused for 
unimportance. If one were to thumb through the pages of the criminal code of 
any jurisdiction one would find scant few, if any, positive legal obligations 
towards other individuals. Negative obligations form the core of any criminal 
code.65 In this kind of law—negative law—positive obligations to other parties 
do of course arise: fiduciary duties, a duty to warn, a duty of care, etc., but far 
less than with contract where new obligations are constantly being generated. 
In no other area of law do we witness this kind of wholesale construction of 
positive obligations to other parties. This distinction is key. Actively doing 
something with designated players as opposed to merely refraining from doing 
something with the public writ large is a critical difference. Contractual law is 
unique in that compliance is not merely framed in the negative; it is also 
framed in the positive—the other party is asked to perform a positive act. 
Other forms of law frame compliance only in the negative—the party is asked 
to refrain from a certain act. An ongoing positive act makes for better 
signaling—it is clearer and more frequent. Actively doing something with a 
specific party naturally generates a round of interaction that may then be 
repeated, creating a sequential iterated game with clear periods of response and 
counter-response between specific parties. This helps solve the prisoner’s 
dilemma by allowing for signaling and the crucial emergence of signal-induced 
trust. 
To illustrate this distinction, let us contrast two simple obligations: The 
first, “give me a kiwi,” and the second, “no one ever take my kiwi.” Positive 
obligations such as “give me a kiwi” require people to step out of the darkness 
 
 64. Fuller touches on the idea that particular forms of law can be distinguished in that they 
involve a certain call to action (though he is speaking of customary law in general): “[W]hat is 
involved is not simply a negation, a prohibition of certain disapproved actions, but also the 
obverse side of this negation, the meaning it confers on foreseeable and approved actions, which 
then furnish a point of orientation for ongoing interactive responses.” Lon L. Fuller, Human 
Interaction and the Law, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. 
FULLER 211, 213–14 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981). 
 65. SMITH, supra note 13, at 7. 
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and form an interactional relationship that has a clear end period. Conversely, 
negative obligations, such as “nobody ever take my kiwi,” merely require 
people to stay put and not do anything—they do not produce interaction of any 
kind. Positive obligations arising from contractual relationships create a clear 
round of interaction between specific parties because, by their very nature, 
something must be overtly performed at a definite point in time and thus 
brought to a conclusion. They therefore allow for signaling. Negative 
obligations do not—the round is simply ongoing and the players are unclear. In 
stipulating that you should give me a kiwi, the framework for a game, which 
may then be repeated, is immediately laid. If the obligation is ongoing (as is 
often the case with long-term contracts, such as “give me a kiwi everyday”) 
then a repeated game is instantly created and a process of signaling is initiated. 
This is what, I posit, accounts for contract’s greater ability to sustain itself. Let 
us unpack this further, and specifically in relation to the prisoner’s dilemma. 
B. Why Positive Obligations Naturally Solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The standard explanation of how the prisoner’s dilemma is solved 
correctly focuses upon repetition and retaliation.66 That the game is repeated is 
crucial in this formula. However, what has been overlooked is how repeated 
interaction also solves the prisoner’s dilemma by fostering signal-induced 
trust. The constituent elements of this form of trust are a natural consequence 
of positive obligations. Ongoing positive obligations imply conditions that 
naturally give rise to private ordering. For expository convenience, I name 
each of these conditions below. 
First, the nature of a positive obligation is such that it clearly defines the 
players of the game, in effect creating a small-group dynamic because such 
obligations are owed to a specific party as opposed to the world writ large. I 
refer to this as specificity. Secondly, in satisfying positive legal obligations 
actors signal—they send observable information regarding compliance: their 
performance signals cooperation to the other party and their non-performance 
instantaneously signals non-cooperation. This helps the parties ascertain each 
other’s time-horizons and this is crucial to building trust. I refer to this simply 
as signaling. Finally, the nature of positive obligations allows for cycles of 
repeated interaction to emerge because it fashions discrete rounds of completed 
interaction. Thus, they naturally break up and iterate interaction, creating 
repeated, signaling opportunities. This allows cooperation to unfold and build 
on itself cautiously in little steps. As the parties repeatedly run through cycles 
of interaction, ever more sophisticated and robust structures of cooperation can 
therefore arise as signal-induced trust emerges. I refer to this as iteration. For 
clarity, these are divided into distinct analytical categories; however, these 
 
 66. LUCA LAMBERTINI, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 82 (2011). 
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conditions are inter-related. Specificity is needed as an essential first step to 
establish both signaling and iteration, and signaling and iteration reinforce each 
other. There needs to be rounds that allow compliance to be frequently 
signaled, and compliance in turn fashions discrete rounds that may be repeated 
by bringing the interaction to a clear conclusion. 
At the heart of the prisoner’s dilemma is the issue of trust. If trust can be 
established then the dilemma is solved. These conditions solve the prisoner’s 
dilemma by generating signal-induced trust.67 Specificity, signaling, and 
iteration are all necessary for signal-induced trust to emerge because the 
intention to cooperate may be repeatedly and clearly demonstrated. Thus, the 
more these properties manifest, the more robust is the potential for private 
order that flows from it. It is not possible for rational trust (and therefore 
private ordering) to emerge if the other party is utterly anonymous, if there are 
no rounds of interaction, and if it is unclear when compliance has even 
occurred. It is not that these conditions cannot arise in the case of negative 
obligations. They can. However, the point here is that positive obligations 
naturally give rise to these conditions. In a sense, they are built into the 
structure of positive acts. This is simply not the case with negative obligations. 
Let me lay out each of these conditions in more detail as these elements bear 
repeating. 
1. Specificity 
The first of these three conditions is specificity. Specificity is a natural 
consequence of positive obligations. Contract with its positive obligations 
solves the problem of the large group of one-shot players because it carves out 
a specific set of participants from the amorphous mass of society, locking them 
into positive interactions that may then be repeated. Contract essentially 
recreates the small group dynamic in an accelerated, concentrated form; 
indeed, it is usually a group of only two parties. And it is able to do this 
precisely because it invokes positive obligations to specific parties. Crucially, 
specificity allows for signaling because it clarifies who is actually playing the 
game. 
2. Signaling 
Signaling is a natural consequence of positive obligations. The nature of a 
positive act is such that it clearly signals compliance (and non-compliance). 
This clarity is crucial to the emergence of signal-induced trust. This is not the 
case with the absence of an act where the signal is muddied, ambiguous, and 
considerably less clear. 
 
 67. The complication of finitely repeated games unraveling cooperation is not brought in 
here. Even if the game does have an endpoint, the model of an infinitely repeated game remains 
appropriate where the players generally do not take this endpoint into their strategic calculations. 
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3. Iteration 
The last of these three conditions is iteration. Not only is signaling 
necessary, it is essential to repeat the signal, a possibility only where there are 
recurrent opportunities to do so. Positive obligations allow for this. Iteration is 
a natural consequence of positive obligations. Positive obligations create clear 
rounds of interaction between parties because positive obligations, by their 
nature, must be performed and at a specific point in time by a specific party. 
They are “discrete in that they demand a particular quantity and quality of 
action at particular points in space and time.”68 It is thus clear when there has 
been compliance (or non-compliance) and a round has ended.69 It is implicit in 
its nature that a positive obligation brings the interaction to a definite 
conclusion—it must be performed in an overtly identifiable manner that allows 
for a transition to the next round. Thus, ongoing positive obligations naturally 
iterate the game (opening the door to repeated signaling). This structure creates 
a sequential, iterated game with clear periods of play. For instance, in the 
above example of an ongoing, positive obligation to give me a kiwi every day, 
each day that you give me a kiwi is a new round of play, and compliance has 
occurred when you give me that kiwi. This construction allows for the 
possibility of repetition between the same players because rounds can be run 
through in a highly-structured fashion, which in turn may give rise to ever 
more sophisticated forms of cooperation constructed upon the stability brought 
about by the parties repeatedly signaling their commitment to long-term 
cooperation. For there to be a high frequency of signaling, there must be many 
opportunities to signal—positive obligations naturally create these 
opportunities. 
Not only is the signal clear and to a specific party, it is frequent. Because 
the relationship is highly iterated, ongoing positive obligations produce a much 
higher frequency of signaling than is with the case of negative obligations. 
Positive obligations define the players and make it clear when a round has been 
completed and with what result. Negative obligations do not. Let us look more 
closely at the negative side of the ledger and its natural deficiencies in terms of 
generating signal-induced trust. 
C. Why Negative Obligations Do Not Solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Law that proffers only negative obligations (negative law) is completely 
different: neither specificity nor signaling nor iteration flows naturally from 
negative obligations. Specificity is not a natural consequence of negative law 
 
 68. TOUCHIE, supra note 63, at 155. 
 69. The folk theorem (that repetition can solve cooperation games) is often criticized as 
being unrealistic in that it assumes that defection signals are emitted instantaneously and 
accurately. See, e.g., HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING 201 (2d ed. 2000). However, 
in the case of positive obligations immediate and clear signaling is exactly what occurs. 
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because the obligations it invokes are not usually owed to a particular party but 
rather to the world writ large. Signaling is not a natural consequence of 
negative obligations. With negative obligations the signal is not as clear as 
with positive obligations (or as frequently telegraphed). Action and the absence 
of action are not on equal footing in terms of the clarity of their signals. 
We do not, for example, ask people to confirm attendance at a dinner party 
by not replying; we ask them to RSVP. We do so because silence would not be 
clear. While an RSVP is unambiguous, silence would not necessarily indicate 
they wish to attend—there may be other reasons for the inaction: perhaps they 
do not care enough about the party to even answer; perhaps they have not yet 
had an opportunity to reply, and so on and so forth. Indeed, this verity is 
reflected in the basic contract principle that silence can never constitute 
acceptance of an offer.70 Acceptance, however, can be communicated through 
conduct, conduct being understood as something overt in nature.71 Likewise, 
with negative obligations, the absence of action does not necessarily signal 
compliance; it does not confirm that the other party (whoever that is exactly) 
even attempted to comply. Many things may account for the presence of 
inaction. In the case of positive obligations, compliance and therefore non-
compliance are completely clear. In the case of negative obligations, only non-
compliance is really clear. This asymmetry is decisive because signal-induced 
trust requires the clear signaling of compliance. With negative obligations, 
compliance and non-compliance are not clear. A signal is only truly clear when 
there has been non-compliance and therefore no possibility of further 
cooperation. 
Drilling down to the core of this difference, we see that, in contrast to the 
performance of a specific action, the absence of an action is the natural state of 
affairs and thus is ambiguous as a signal. It is for this reason that we do not 
signal S.O.S. with silence, signal stop with an unlit traffic light, or ask if 
someone is home by requesting them to remain silent. Silence, an unlit light, 
and the lack of response are not clear signals. This distinction is evident in the 
case of a nagging mother where the mother shouts at her teenage son lying in 
bed, “if you really want to help me get out of bed” (a positive act) and where 
on another occasion she says, “if you really want to help me just stay in bed 
and out of my way” (a negative act). In both instances, the son hears her. With 
the first statement compliance and non-compliance are both clear (the son gets 
up or stays in bed). With the second, however, the son staying in bed does not 
clearly indicate that he is complying—that he is a good cooperator with long-
term time horizons—perhaps he just wants to sleep in. The outcome does not 
provide any clarity regarding the teenager’s motivations. It is not a good 
signal. Is he a good cooperator or is he just lazy? The signal is ambiguous 
 
 70. See Felthouse v. Bindley, (1862) 142 Eng. Rep. 1037 (C.P.). 
 71. See Brogden v. Metro. Ry. Co., [1877] L.R. 2 App. Cas. 666. 
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because no overt action is required. This is precisely the difference between 
positive and negative obligations. Negative acts are lousy signals; they are by 
their nature unclear. They are thus not conducive to signal-induced trust. 
Signal-induced trust needs the clear and repeated communication of 
compliance to grow. In the case of negative obligations there is no clear 
signaling, no definite observable information being sent. Signal-induced trust 
cannot evolve from such a murky state. Clear, unambiguous signaling is 
required and this is only possible in the case of positive not negative 
obligations. 
Moreover, ongoing positive obligations naturally bring about a high 
frequency of signaling because they iterate the game. Iteration is not a natural 
consequence of negative obligations because the dynamic created by, for 
example, demanding that no one ever take one’s kiwi is merely an ongoing 
state of inaction. It is one of something not occurring, i.e., of not taking the 
kiwi. Refraining from doing something has no clear end.72 There is no 
conclusion to the round. The players—and this is an important point—are thus 
stuck perpetually in just one period of play. It is essentially a one-shot game 
played with all of society. Indeed, negative obligations do not create repeated 
interactions—they are the very absence of them. A cycle only completes itself 
where there is no possibility of further cooperation; that is, where there has 
been non-compliance. Assuming there is compliance, the round will continue 
indefinitely. With a positive act, compliance and non-compliance both mark 
the end of a cycle, a round of interaction. With a negative act, only non-
compliance will mark the end of a cycle.73 These cycles are essential because 
they provide opportunities for the actors to repeatedly signal. 
With negative acts, one is not engaging in repeated play with a specific 
party that allows for frequent signaling. Negative law is merely a negative 
obligation issued to the world writ large, i.e., “nobody ever take my kiwi.” In 
the anonymity of a large group, negative obligations do not solve the prisoner’s 
dilemma because they do not produce the conditions that tend to give rise to 
signal-induced trust, and thus to self-sustaining private order. 
 
 72. Hayek also points this out. See TOUCHIE, supra note 63, at 155 (“Negative duties, then, 
being continuously in effect, are not ‘carried out’ or satisfied by the performance of conduct and 
can be addressed to the entire world . . . .”). 
 73. It is often the case that even where negative obligations are stipulated in contract, this 
inaction is unique in the sense that it is often tethered to a specific time or event that still allows 
the “game” to be sequenced. In a sense, the condition of iteration, a natural property of a positive 
obligation, is artificially created. It is still clear when compliance (inaction in this case) has been 
observed and a round of play has concluded. I would submit that in these cases, the inaction, 
because it is linked to a specific time period or event, is not akin to a standard negative obligation. 
In that it is linked to a particular time or event it should be conceptualized differently. 
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D. An Example Involving Telephones and a Man Named Bartley 
We may at this point in our discussion be in danger of slipping into 
abstractions so let us ground this with another example, one involving two 
scenarios: scenarios X and Y. In this example, scenario X represents 
contractual relationships and scenario Y corresponds to other forms of law. In 
scenario X, Bartley asks his neighbor to call him the next day at exactly 9:15 
PM, at which time Bartley will designate a new time for his neighbor to call 
him again the following day. In scenario Y, Bartley simply announces to the 
entire world (somehow) that no one should ever call him. 
Scenario X, because it elicits a positive action, exhibits specificity, 
signaling, and iteration. There will emerge in scenario X definite cycles of 
interaction that will lead to further cycles of dealings between Bartley and his 
neighbor. Signal-induced trust may thus arise. Moreover, cooperation can grow 
increasingly sophisticated, as there is reduced need for a constant reliance upon 
immediate retaliation to avoid the trap of the prisoner’s dilemma. In scenario 
X, each day is a new period of play. Bartley’s neighbor complies, then Bartley 
complies, then his neighbor complies, and on it goes. This frequent interplay 
sets the stage for stable rules to emerge because it allows for the evolution of a 
cooperative relationship based upon signal-induced trust. The difference 
between scenarios X and Y is one of positive and negative obligations. What is 
occurring is that the existence of a positive obligation to call creates repeated 
periods of play (iteration) with a specific party (specificity), which allows for 
the frequent, clear signaling of compliance and non-compliance (signaling). 
In contrast to this, scenario Y lacks all these conditions. There is no 
iteration; the players in scenario Y are stuck perpetually in one period of play. 
The round only ends when someone calls, otherwise it never really finishes. 
With scenario X, because it is a positive act, a definitive response is elicited at 
a precise point in time, and so the game can then transition to the next round of 
cooperation. This is not the case with scenario Y. There is also no specificity. 
It is in effect a one-shot game played with the entire world. The players are not 
even known—it is never clear who is not calling Bartley. There is no partner 
with whom to even build cooperative trust. Finally, there is no clear signaling. 
Indeed, scenario Y highlights the difficulty of communicating positive 
compliance through negative obligations. That no one has called Bartley does 
not necessarily indicate that anyone is actively cooperating with him. In fact, 
Bartley might be unaware of the countless aborted attempts to call him that 
may have occurred. The signaling of cooperation in scenario Y is not 
comparable in terms of clarity to that of a scenario X. Compliance in the case 
of a positive act is unambiguously clear because something is done. 
Compliance in the case of a negative act remains unclear because nothing is 
being done. This lack of clarity regarding the other party’s intentions (or even 
who the other party is) inhibits the emergence of signal-induced trust. 
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With negative obligations, there is no clear partner, no clear round of 
interaction, and no clear signaling of compliance. As a result, signal-induced 
trust simply cannot emerge. And so it goes with law. The difference between 
contractual and other forms of law is in actively repeating something with 
specific partners, and doing so in defined stages that allows for clear signaling. 
In the case of ongoing positive obligations the game is iterated. This makes it 
possible for repeated signaling. With an ongoing commercial contract, for 
instance, A orders goods from B; B delivers the goods on a certain date; A 
pays for them on delivery. If one party complies or fails to comply, the other 
knows immediately. The key ingredients of private order are thus present in 
this kind of relationship: specificity, signaling, and iteration. Threat-induced 
trust can, over time, thus be replaced by signal-induced trust, a more flexible 
dynamic that allows for the emergence of more sophisticated cooperative 
structures. Where there is sustained cooperation, rules emerge to structure the 
cooperation. In this fashion systems of private ordering may grow.74 
The dynamic involved in other areas of law is entirely different. It is that of 
scenario Y—one is not engaging in repeated play with a specific party. It is 
merely a negative obligation issued to the world writ large—do not infringe on 
anyone else’s property rights, etc. With large groups, a negative obligation 
does nothing to generate rational trust because the players are not made known 
and they do not actively engage with each other. Players do not engage in 
repeated interactions—in fact, they do not interact at all. As a result, 
specificity, signaling, and iteration are entirely absent. The difference is 
between actively doing something with another party and simply doing nothing 
with the entire world. With the latter there is no possibility for signal-induced 
trust between specific parties and compliance means the game period never 
ends. It only ends with explicit non-cooperation and then terminates, unable to 
continue. While positive obligations, by their nature, lay the groundwork for 
repeated interactions, negative obligations, by their nature, inhibit it. In the 
case of positive obligations, one knows precisely who is complying and when, 
a dynamic that allows cooperation to build on itself as players run through 
repeated cycles of cooperative interaction, giving rise to stable forms of 
cooperation as signal-induced trust emerges. 
E. Negative Law Needs the State; Positive Law Needs it Far Less 
In a sense, we have two kinds of law: law that creates only negative 
obligations, and law that creates both negative and positive obligations.75 For 
 
 74. Also of great significance, though not discussed here, is that over time the rule may even 
be internalized, taking on a genuine normative quality. 
 75. This Article does not address the rich jurisprudential debate underlying negative and 
positive rights: positive rights allow or oblige action, whereas negative rights allow or oblige 
inaction. The present argument merely observes that such obligations do in fact exist in the law 
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expository purposes, I have been calling the first negative law. For 
consistency, I will now call the second positive law.76 The implications of this 
difference loom large: law that only creates negative obligations generally 
needs the State to back it lest it fall prey to the prisoner’s dilemma. For areas of 
law such as criminal and tort where only negative injunctions are created 
(mostly), the State will always be required to give it teeth. 
If the parties are known and future rounds of interaction expected, negative 
obligations may produce conditional cooperation to an extent—we can 
formulate scenarios where this may indeed be the case. For example, with 
every day that passes that my valuables are not stolen from my hotel room, I 
may become reasonably sure that the hotel does not employ any thieves. In 
such a situation signal-induced trust can build slowly (though not quite so 
robustly) because the players are made somewhat clear (i.e., the hotel’s general 
cleaning staff), and there are even rounds of play that allow for signaling (i.e., 
each day the workers come into my room to clean). Thus, specificity, 
signaling, and iteration are present, albeit in a very muddied form. 
However, in a large N-person prisoner’s dilemma,77 these conditions do 
not exist. The players are mostly not known and there is not any kind of 
repetition. There is no specificity, signaling, or iteration. To use the above 
example: the case would be very different if instead of the hotel’s cleaning 
staff having access to my hotel room, the entire city did. Society is mostly a 
large N-person prisoner’s dilemma, thus negative obligations cannot generate 
signal-induced trust. Ongoing positive obligations, by contrast, naturally 
produce the conditions that give rise to signal-induced trust because their very 
nature demands that they are performed with a specific party and at a specific 
point in time, creating both identifiable players and specific rounds of play that 
allow for signaling—specificity, signaling, and iteration are generated. Positive 
obligations in effect recreate the conditions of a small group. Rational trust 
may thus build much faster where there are positive acts, and trust builds much 
slower, if at all, in the absence of an act. 
Yet the vast majority of law is negative law. When legal compliance is 
framed in the negative with unknown parties, as it usually is (for example, 
criminal law, tort etc.), private ordering is not as sustainable. Negative law is a 
non-sequential, non-iterated game with unknown players stuck perpetually in 
one round of play, and so there is nothing to build on. It is a world of one-shot 
predators. Negative law is non-iterated. It is like two commercial parties stuck 
 
(although in an imbalanced manner) and the analysis proceeds from there. Rights theory and the 
normative justifications for this divide are not the focus of this paper; the focus is merely the 
importance of positive obligations in respect to private ordering. 
 76. To be clear, this term is not meant to imply positive law in its legal positivist sense—
simply the kind of law that invokes positive legal obligations to act. 
 77. That is, there are many unknown players. 
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perpetually in a single transaction that never ends: there is no trust because the 
transaction has not yet been completed. In this kind of dynamic, rational trust 
is not possible—threat-induced trust is not possible let alone signal-induced 
trust. The strategy of all the other parties can never be known with certainty 
and so the threat of state coercion is necessary to prevent defection.78 We need 
state power to solve the prisoner’s dilemma. Without it, such systems dangle 
perpetually upon a precipice of anarchy.79 
It is tempting to simply attribute non-contractual law’s need for external 
enforcement to the absence of mutual gain that so clearly animates contract. 
According to this view, the element of mutual benefit is what allows contract 
to sustain itself in the absence of the State. The parties follow the rules because 
it is in both their interests to do so.80 This view, however, is only partially 
correct. Mutual benefit alone is not enough. Even if other areas of law 
provided mutual advantage,81 this alone would not be sufficient to sustain 
order because such areas of law are primarily negative law—they lack the 
necessary conditions that solve the prisoner’s dilemma. Unless the prisoner’s 
dilemma is solved private order cannot emerge. It is obvious that long-term 
contracts tend to create a repeated game dynamic. However, what is not 
obvious is that positive obligations play the decisive role in this, and that this 
repetition allows for the emergence of signal-induced trust. This is important 
because positive obligations are simply not present in other areas of law. Thus, 
these areas of law lack a comparable capacity to become self-sustaining. The 
prisoner’s dilemma implicit in human cooperation sabotages the prospect of 
self-sustaining legal order. For negative law, the heavy hand of the State is 
needed to maintain order. Thus, any system of legal order that creates positive 
obligations between parties (positive law), as in the case of contract, will be 
relatively more predisposed to generating self-sustaining systems of order. The 
greater the presence of positive obligations, the greater the law’s potential for 
private ordering. 
This gives rise to a much broader question: what conclusions may be 
gleaned from applying performance signaling theory to law in an international 
context where there is no overarching authority, no centralized enforcement 
regime to speak of? To what extent can this theory help explain the emergence 
 
 78. S. R. EPSTEIN, FREEDOM AND GROWTH 8 (2000). 
 79. This is not, however, meant to imply that if formal law was removed people would rush 
out and start murdering each other. This is thankfully not the case; internalized normative beliefs 
powerfully reinforce these rules. However, this does not apply to all actors—murderers do walk 
among us. Moreover, while normatively charged rules of conduct such as those regulated by 
criminal law may be mostly internalized, this is not the case for other less normatively potent 
areas of law, such as tax law, company law, or many areas of tort. For negative law in this 
context, the punitive hand of the state is indeed required. 
 80. ALEXANDER, supra note 25, at 47. 
 81. And indeed such areas of law arguably do in that actors are able to avoid costly conflict. 
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of public international law despite the lack of any coercive authority? It is to 
this question of tremendous importance that we now turn, and it is to this 
question that the remainder of the discussion is devoted. 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT FLOW FROM 
PERFORMANCE SIGNALING THEORY 
The previous section mapped out the basics of performance signaling 
theory; this section applies it. Performance signaling theory has important 
implications for public international law in that it emerges in the vacuum of 
centralized enforcement. It was argued above that contract-based law possesses 
a more powerful ability to sustain itself without third-party enforcement 
compared with legal order constructed from negative law, and that this is a 
result of its use of positive obligations, which facilitate signaling. This applies 
equally in an international context between national governments. Political 
scientists have devoted considerable attention to how international legal 
regimes induce compliance and why they often fail to do so.82 Performance 
signaling theory may prove useful in illuminating why some treaties are 
successful in this regard while others flounder. It may help answer an 
important two-pronged question: given that power and geopolitical interests 
shape the behavior of state actors, to what extent can a treaty’s structure 
determine compliance, and if so, how should these international instruments be 
crafted to elicit compliance? Game theory has been extensively applied to 
treaty compliance, specifically in relation to verification.83 Performance 
signaling theory may be useful here. Positive obligations are clearly not the 
sole determining factor in whether or not a treaty is successful, but it may play 
a significant role. The remainder of this discussion explores the extent of this 
role and the theory’s broader implications for public international law. 
A. Public International Law as a Form of Private Ordering 
By the term public international law I mean an expansive range of 
agreements and practices that includes not only formal treaties, but also 
customary international law and even the international norms that underpin it. 
 
 82. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 
(1981); Jutta Brunnée, Enforcement Mechanisms in International Law and International 
Environmental Law, 3 ENVTL. L. NETWORK INT’L REV. 1, 3 (2005); Abram Chayes & Antonia 
Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); Harold K. Jacobson & Edith 
Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES 1, 2, 7 (Edith Brown Weiss 
& Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998); O. N. Khlestov, The Origin and Prospects for Development of 
Control over Compliance with International Obligations of States, in CONTROL OVER 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (W. E. Butler ed., 1991). 
 83. For an excellent overview of this literature, see Barry O’Neill, Game Theory Models of 
Peace and War, in 2 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 1017–18 
(Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart eds., 1994). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] OPENING THE MACHINERY OF PRIVATE ORDER 451 
Treaties, however, form the apex of international legal order—they are its most 
concrete and deliberate form.84 For the most part, international law is now 
developing primarily through treaties.85 As such, treaty law is our focus here.86 
Yet, it is important that we not delude ourselves into believing that we are now 
living in an age where international law is firmly established and rapidly 
converging—this is hardly the case.87 What we are witnessing is an 
exceedingly slow, painstaking evolution of legal order on the international 
stage. There is no central authority able to reliably enforce law on a global 
scale.88 Indeed, on an international level, we still face a Hobbesian state of 
nature where state actors remain largely unrestrained. Many claim there is no 
“real” international law, certainly not in the sense of its domestic counterpart, 
in that it lacks a central coercive authority.89 International law presents a 
puzzle to some extent. Despite the absence of such an authority, legal order has 
steadily been evolving in an international context.90 With state actors we are, in 
many crucial respects, hurled back to the position that bands of individuals are 
in without state law. It is a technical state of anarchy. Yet legal order arises 
nonetheless. 
Legal order emerges in one of two ways:91 either as the child of a single 
overarching authority, usually a nation-state, that possesses a monopoly on 
enforcement so that the rules it fashions are backed by coercive force, or as a 
system of private order between actors cooperating without recourse to any 
higher authority to enforce the rules that govern their interactions.92 
International law is a product of the second. As one scholar remarked, public 
international law may be defined as “law between states, not above states.”93 
Indeed, anyone who doubts the possibility of spontaneous law—the ability of 
legal order to emerge without resort to a centralized enforcement regime—
 
 84. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 810 (5th ed. 2003). 
 85. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, TRAINING MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2 (2006). See also G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE 
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1983); Rüdiger Wolfrum, Legitimacy of International 
Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory Considerations, in LEGITIMACY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2008). 
 86. The theory laid out in part two, however, could also readily be applied to these other 
components of international law, such as customary law. Arguably, the lex mercatoria is an 
illustrative example. Indeed, the theory may be applied to private law in an international context 
in general. However, this is not explored here but rather offered as a future avenue of research. 
 87. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2005). 
 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. For a discussion along these lines, see id. 
 90. ANDREW T. GUZMÁN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 9 (2008). 
 91. Although a more nuanced approach might hold that law may also arise as a combination 
of both. 
 92. See ELLICKSON, supra note 5, at 1, 137. 
 93. L.N. RANGARAJAN, THE LIMITATION OF CONFLICT 223 (1985). 
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should take note of the growth of public international law. Indeed, the legal 
centrist would be at pains to account for how international legal order can arise 
at all upon the world stage where, clearly, there is no such central 
supranational authority.94 The existence of public international law is a 
testament to not only the plausibility of private ordering but of its indisputable 
existence. Public international law is, as Fuller calls it, a model example of a 
“horizontal” form of order as opposed to a “vertical” system of order imposed 
by a central authority.95 
Indeed, if we depart slightly from the strict definition of private ordering 
(i.e., the coming together of non-governmental parties in voluntary 
arrangements),96 a case could be made that public international law is best 
understood as a form of private order in that it evolves without recourse to any 
overarching authority beyond itself. Indeed, it is used precisely in this sense 
below. With treaties there is “no small claims court for redressing failure to 
perform as agreed, no state police power to compel restitution for bad faith, no 
formal mechanisms comparable to those available to citizens who enter 
contracts.”97 Treaties are a form of private ordering, but one where the 
participants are simply state actors rather than individuals. The theory of 
private order laid out above can therefore shed useful light on the ability of 
treaty law to sustain itself despite the absence of third-party enforcement. 
B. The International Lex Scripta: Treaties Are Essentially Contracts Between 
States 
In many respects, international treaties are a paradigm of private ordering. 
Since the second half of the twentieth century their use has exploded in the 
international community: approximately 54,000 treaties have been registered 
with the United Nations since 1945 (and this probably only represents about 
seventy percent of all treaties).98 The 1969 Vienna Convention defines a treaty 
as “an international agreement concluded between states in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular design.”99 A treaty 
thus embraces all instruments formed between two or more international 
juridical persons; conventions, agreements, protocols, and exchanges of letters 
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or notes may all constitute treaties.100 Yet at its most basic level, a treaty is 
simply a contract between state actors.101 “A treaty,” Chief Justice John 
Marshall once observed, “is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a 
legislative act.”102 In a treaty, parties willingly assume obligations between 
themselves, and like contract, the two sides do so because they seek to gain 
some benefit. Russell Hardin makes this point: “Treaties are roughly analogous 
to contract and mutual promises. Like contracts, they are formal; like promises, 
they are backed by no higher authority. We enter into promises, contracts and 
treaties because each party expects to gain as a result.”103 Treaties are similar 
to contracts in that they “express a mutual exchange of rights and 
obligations.”104 
Indeed, bilateral agreements in particular resemble simple contracts far 
more than they do statutory law.105 Bilateral treaties represent the vast majority 
of international treaties.106 As such, they are the primary focus here. Yet, 
multilateral treaties are also similar to contracts in many respects; restricted 
multilateral treaties are very much like contractual arrangements in that they 
often assign positive obligations involving close cooperation between states for 
a specific purpose, such as the construction of a dam or aspects of economic 
integration, as with the European community.107 Such treaties set out particular 
rights and obligations as they relate to these specific endeavors and bind only 
those states named in the treaty that have consented to it.108 And just as 
contract is constructed upon the core principle of consent, so too are treaties 
and international agreements founded upon the notion of consenting parties.109 
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In fact, the term consensual law is used in international public law parlance to 
describe law voluntarily adopted by states, such as treaty obligations.110 
Indeed, “Treaties are in this sense contracts between states.”111 A treaty has 
force only for those states that have consented to be bound by it.112 Treaties are 
predicated upon consent because, just as with contract, parties voluntarily enter 
into them motivated by self-interest. It is a fundamental principle of treaty law 
that not only are treaties binding upon these parties, but also, like private 
contracts, they are expected to be performed by the parties in good faith.113 The 
basic principle pacta sunt sevanda (“agreements must be kept”) applies, 
implying that non-fulfillment of the respective obligations is a breach of the 
pact. Treaties may even be ended on grounds that are very much analogous to 
contract law defenses.114 
Yet unlike contract, there is no central governing authority able to compel 
parties to a treaty to abide by the agreement.115 Despite this, treaties can often 
achieve a high level of self-enforcement.116 Where treaties are self-sustaining, 
it is for precisely the same reasons that contract may be. Treaties, like contract, 
are predicated upon the same dynamic of mutual benefit. However, like 
contract, this benefit alone is not always enough to ensure compliance. 
Although states generally benefit from treaty agreements, there is often a 
strong incentive to free ride (this is particularly true of large multi-lateral 
treaties aimed at providing public goods such as environmental treaties).117 Let 
us take a closer look at how long-term, self-sustaining cooperation is able to 
emerge between state actors in the context of treaties. 
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C. International Treaties Are Largely Self-Sustaining Because They Exhibit 
the Same Characteristics Produced by Positive Obligations 
One scholar famously observed that “almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law . . . almost all of the time.”118 Yet apart from the 
total collapse of the treaty, the threat of retaliation is actually quite limited. 
Collective enforcement through penalties and binding judicial processes such 
as dispute settlement remains relatively rare.119 Sanctioning authority is seldom 
granted by treaties and rarely used even where it is granted.120 As a 
consequence, signal-induced trust is far more important in the long-term 
success and sustainability of a treaty than threat-induced trust. Private ordering 
emerges between state actors just as it emerges between individuals through 
long-term contract. A treaty possesses a strong potential to give rise to private 
order because it mimics the dynamic of contract and thus produces the 
conditions necessary for private order discussed earlier: specificity, signaling, 
and iteration. To the extent that treaties exhibit these conditions, private 
ordering is more likely to emerge. The more these conditions are present, the 
more robust is this potential. Where these conditions are less pronounced or 
totally absent as they are with some treaties, international agreements are far 
less likely to generate self-sustaining legal order. 
In what ways do treaties possess the constituent conditions of private 
order? The first of these is party specificity. In regards to treaties, this 
condition is always present. Like contract, the specific participants to the 
agreement are clearly designated, and, as in the case of contract, this specificity 
creates a small-group dynamic because obligations are owed to specific parties 
as opposed to simply the world writ large. This condition is met in the case of 
multilateral as well as bilateral treaties—in a treaty the parties are always 
identified. However, regarding the remaining conditions of iteration and 
signaling, whether or not these conditions are present very much depends on 
the particular provisions and nature of the treaty. Treaties cover a broad range 
of subjects: the termination of hostilities, the settling of economic disputes, the 
acquisition of territory, nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, 
environmental issues, issues surrounding international transportation, the 
exchange of scientific technology, space exploration, telecommunications, 
mutual defense, the forging of economic links, and so on and so forth. For the 
most part, treaties will involve positive obligations that are to be met by the 
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parties to the treaty. Where they do, the conditions for private ordering will be 
present. 
This, however, is not always the case. Treaties do not always involve 
positive obligations. Examining treaties from this perspective may prove very 
useful in terms of accounting for their sustainability as systems of private 
order. I will first discuss the case where treaties do not invoke positive 
obligations but rather call for an absence of action, examining the impact of 
this upon a treaty’s ability to sustain itself over the long term. I will then look 
at how the majority of treaties, like most contracts, do in fact impose positive 
obligations upon the parties involved, and the importance of this for the future 
of public international law. It should be noted that the approach assumed here 
is very much in line with rationalist theories, notably institutionalism and 
political economy that conceptualizes states as strategic actors guided by 
rationally assessed self-interest.121 While the subject of treaties is a complex 
one, the discussion proceeds on a very general level. The rich theoretical 
literature on treaty compliance is not explored. The purpose of the present 
discussion is better served if an overly technical discussion of treaty law is 
avoided—the issue before us is simply how, with reference to the principle of 
positive obligations, private ordering arises through treaties. For that, a special 
approach is required. There are a variety of ways to categorize treaties. 
However, the present analysis calls for a very particular taxonomy, one related 
to the nature of the obligations created. These are: treaties that deal almost 
exclusively with negative obligations, treaties that deal predominately with 
negative obligations but employ positive obligations to shore up their 
deficiencies in terms of signaling, and treaties that deal primarily with positive 
obligations and as such possess the greatest potential for private ordering 
because they possess very robust signals. Each will be dealt with in turn. 
D. Treaties that Deal Almost Exclusively with Negative Obligations 
Treaties generally fit the bill of positive law: they clearly define the players 
of the game, which creates a small group dynamic, and they usually fashion 
discrete rounds of interaction, which allows observable information regarding 
compliance to be communicated. The extent to which a treaty creates these 
critical conditions determines the extent to which it can sustain private order 
because it allows for the emergence of signal-induced trust. As in the case with 
contracts, treaties that impose positive obligations upon the parties naturally 
create these conditions. However, not all types of treaties create positive 
obligations: certain treaties, by their nature, do not call for action but rather an 
absence of action. In this respect, they resemble negative law—but not 
entirely. 
 
 121. Brunnée, supra note 119, at 9. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] OPENING THE MACHINERY OF PRIVATE ORDER 457 
A classic example of a treaty that deals almost exclusively with negative 
obligations, calling for an absence of action rather than action, is a military 
non-aggression treaty between two states. By their nature, treaties of this kind 
call for inaction: refraining from military hostilities. Returning to our hotel 
analogy, the dynamic of such treaties is comparable to a situation where my 
valuables do not go missing from my hotel room but there is only one member 
of the staff who has access to my room. Each day that passes and my valuables 
are not stolen buoys my confidence that the staff member is not a thief. This is 
because the players of the game are specified (the staff member and I) and 
there is a limited kind of signaling. The anonymity of a N-person prisoner’s 
dilemma is solved in this case (indeed, the anonymity of players is a major 
deficiency of negative law, and this is always resolved in the case of treaties). 
It is the case with all treaties, regardless of the kinds of obligations they create, 
that the actors are specified. This fact alone creates the conditions of a small 
group. The fact that the parties are known allows for a certain degree of 
signaling. This structure is not the equivalent of negative law, and as such fares 
a comparatively better chance at sustaining itself. This is, however, tempered 
by the fact that the other two conditions for private order are not met. 
While in the hotel analogy there is a basic form of signaling (my valuables 
have not yet been stolen), the signal is not entirely clear. For instance, I do not 
know if the staff member attempted to steal my valuables but could not find 
them, or did not yet have an opportunity to leave his post to sneak into my 
room. I do not know if perhaps he is planning to steal my valuables tomorrow 
when circumstances are more optimal. In terms of signaling, his not stealing 
my valuables is considerably less clear as his performing an overt action of 
some kind. This is the dynamic present in the case of a non-aggression treaty 
between two states. Signaling is possible to a limited extent in that the other 
party has not yet attacked; however, as with the hotel analogy, the signal is not 
as clear as in the case of positive actions where compliance is, by its nature, an 
overt act. One is less sure of the situation. As a result, signal-induced trust will 
not emerge, at least not to any significant degree. Moreover, no clear rounds of 
play are generated that may reinforce these signals. It is not an iterated game: 
the players are stuck perpetually in one round of play. The round only ends 
when the staff member steals my valuables, and a state only knows a non-
aggression treaty has been broken when it has been attacked. Because there are 
no clear rounds of play, signaling opportunities are not as clear. As such, 
signal-induced trust will not emerge—cheating looms as an ever-present threat. 
There is no reliable information being repeatedly transmitted regarding the 
strategy of the other party. The motivation for the other party’s inaction 
remains unclear. It is not fertile soil for trust. 
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Take for instance the Korean Armistice Agreement. It contains no positive 
obligations that may be repeated as clear signals of cooperation. The 
agreement famously calls for a demilitarized zone;122 however, this is primarily 
negative in nature and does not create rounds of repeated signaling that may 
build trust. The initial ceasing of hostilities was a positive action (and a clear 
signal); however, thereafter it immediately reverted into an ongoing negative 
action. The agreement’s obligations are of a very limited character. There is 
only a very paltry form of signaling. As such, the agreement has not given rise 
to a relationship of robust trust. North and South Korea have remained 
dangling upon the precipice of hostilities for the past half-century, stuck 
essentially in one period of play.123 Beyond the maintenance of the 
demilitarized zone, only a very rudimentary form of signaling is present: the 
absence of outright military attack. This has been insufficient to stimulate 
signal-induced trust between the former combatants. The rational trust that 
does exist between the two is merely a very basic threat-induced trust, just 
sufficient to keep the prisoner’s dilemma in check. 
As is the case with non-aggression treaties, only a very limited and 
rudimentary form of signaling exists insufficient to give rise to signal-induced 
trust. It is the case that the first condition (party specificity) is met; however, 
the second condition (signaling) remains undeveloped, and the third condition 
(iteration) is totally absent. A stronger treaty in this vein would be one that 
calls for a series of positive acts—for example, inspections of troop levels, the 
destruction of arms manufacturing plants, etc.—as these sorts of positive 
obligations would create rounds of signaling. Treaties that employ almost 
exclusively negative obligations, while possessing a better potential for private 
ordering than pure negative law in that the players are at least known and basic 
signaling is possible, possess a significantly less robust potential to give rise to 
self-sustaining legal order than other forms of treaties. It is perhaps partially 
for this reason that bilateral non-aggression treaties, once a very popular form 
of international instrument in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
largely fell out of use after the Second World War.124 
International agreements that involve negative obligations can achieve a 
degree of sustainability only to the extent that all the elements naturally 
generated by positive law—specificity, signaling, and iteration—are present. 
Thus, treaties that employ predominantly negative obligations yet also 
incorporate positive obligations are comparatively better positioned to produce 
stable private ordering than treaties that only employ negative obligations. It is 
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for this reason that treaties are often deliberately crafted so as to include some 
manner of positive obligations. 
E. Treaties that Deal Predominately with Negative Obligations but Employ 
Positive Obligations 
Good examples of treaties of this kind are arms control treaties that 
prohibit the building or stockpiling of certain weapons.125 While such treaties 
impose an obligation of inaction (refraining from the building of certain 
arms)—the sole purpose of such treaties—they typically incorporate positive 
acts to be performed that solve the inherent, structural shortcomings of 
agreements based solely upon the absence of action. Treaties of this type do 
this because they must—by their nature, they involve negative obligations 
where compliance and non-compliance may go totally undetected and 
therefore signal-induced trust cannot arise. Indeed, signaling may be entirely 
absent—not even the luxury of knowing when defection has occurred is 
afforded. Thus, in order to shore up this failing and generate at least the 
potential for sustainability, the drafters inject positive obligations into the 
treaty that allow for signaling and iteration in addition to mere specificity. 
This typically takes the form of robust verification regimes and specific 
deadlines that require positive acts to be met in a predetermined sequence 
thereby “artificially” creating rounds of play that provide opportunities for 
repeated signaling. Treaties of this kind are typically drafted so as to break up 
the process into periods of play, creating an iterated-game dynamic where 
signaling is possible. In this fashion, all three elements of private ordering are 
assured: specificity, signaling, and iteration. Signal-induced trust thus has the 
potential to arise, infusing a measure of stability into the treaty. In that 
retaliation apart from outright termination of the treaty is not always practical 
or even available, the significance of verification is better conceptualized not 
as a retaliatory opportunity, but rather as a signaling opportunity that builds 
signal-induced trust between the parties. Verification is simply the creation of 
repeated signaling rounds where otherwise there would be none. With this in 
mind, the famous Russian proverb “trust but verify” might be better expressed 
as “trust but signal,” as it is repeated signaling that creates trust. Because such 
treaties employ only negative obligations, the conditions of private order are 
not fully present. The situation remains a one-shot game. Parties cannot 
verify/signal, so they cannot trust and lack the ingredients for sustained, robust 
cooperation. Parties are thus forced to find a solution: they embed positive 
obligations in the treaty, creating verification regimes and rounds of play that 
allow for repeated signaling. They do so not with a full understanding of the 
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impact of positive obligations, but rather because such an approach seems most 
intuitive in terms of achieving compliance. 
The verification regimes of treaties such as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), the objectives of which are purely negative in nature, have 
installed mechanisms to facilitate complex signaling. The CWC, for example, 
calls for a host of positive actions: national declarations, the implementation of 
legislation, data collection, the creation of a national authority, routine 
inspections, and challenging inspections.126 Positive obligations such as these 
create signaling. Verification provides an opportunity for states to demonstrate 
compliance.127 Other arms control treaties call for a straightforward reduction 
in arms, which is in fact itself a positive action, yet nonetheless falls victim to 
the same shortcomings of negative obligations in that signaling can remain 
uncertain despite its positive character. To compensate for this, parties to these 
kinds of treaties create elaborate verification measures to ensure signaling. For 
example, in order to clearly signal compliance under the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START I), the U.S. military severed 365 B-52s into five 
separate parts, leaving the ruined parts in place for ninety days so Russian spy 
satellites could verify the bombers had been destroyed.128 
The New START treaty, which reduces the United States’ and the Russian 
Federation’s respective stockpiles of nuclear weapons, is a recent illustrative 
example of how a treaty may “artificially” create iteration and signaling, albeit 
at its most remedial, undeveloped level.129 The terms of the New START 
treaty call for a number of specific actions within designated periods covering 
a period extending from the first few days after entering into force up to the 
entire ten-year life of the treaty.130 The implementation process thus builds in 
repeated rounds of signaling into its structure. For instance, the treaty calls for: 
an exchange of inspector information within the first twenty-five days after 
entry into force;131 the provision of information on the numbers, locations, and 
technical characteristics of weapon systems no later than forty-five days;132 an 
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exhibition of strategic offensive arms no later than sixty days;133 the right to 
begin inspections at sixty days;134 the one-time exhibition of U.S. heavy 
bombers no later than 120 days;135 a further exhibition of sensitive technology 
no later than 180 days;136 the exchange of updated databases no later than 225 
days;137 the one-time exhibition of a U.S. B-1B heavy bomber no later than one 
year after entry into force;138 a one-time exhibition of missile launchers no 
later than three years;139 both parties to meet the limits laid out in the treaty 
regarding warheads and their delivery systems no later than seven years;140 and 
the possible ratification of the treaty at its expiry ten years after entry into 
force.141 
The rounds for signaling are mostly concentrated in the earlier phases of 
the treaty. These signaling rounds are designed to generate a measure of signal-
induced trust designed to carry the parties through the life of the treaty and, 
ideally, beyond to its extension. The treaty gradually builds up to more costly 
acts of compliance as signal-induced trust emerges between the parties. The 
most costly round of compliance is not until seven years into the treaty. This 
structure parallels commercial parties engaging in long-term contractual 
interaction: initially, only small steps of calculated low-risk trust are required; 
this is then increased as rational trust emerges from repeated rounds of 
signaling. The treaty is crafted so as to generate a limited self-sustaining 
system of private order between the United States and the Russian Federation 
regarding strategic arms reduction, and signal-induced trust is invoked to 
achieve this. The treaty is structured to do this through its use of positive 
obligations in sequenced rounds of play thereby ensuring repeated, clear 
signaling opportunities. 
Treaties that are primarily negative in nature do not have all the natural 
properties for private ordering. Thus, we see attempts to shore up this 
deficiency by embedding positive obligations into the treaty. Arms control 
treaties are good examples of this. Treaties that employ predominately positive 
obligations, however, possess all the natural properties that may give rise to 
private order. It is to such agreements that I now turn. 
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F. Treaties that Employ Predominately Positive Obligations 
Treaties that employ predominately positive obligations possess the 
strongest potential to produce sustainable private ordering because they foster 
the emergence of signal-induced trust. Perhaps the archetypal example of a 
treaty of this kind is the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (TEEC), otherwise known as the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty 
created the legal superstructure upon which the European Union, perhaps the 
definitive example of a complex system of evolving transnational private 
order, was eventually constructed.142 The structure of the treaty naturally 
allowed for repeated signaling. The Treaty of Rome established a twelve-year 
implementation period divided into three stages of four years each, thereby 
creating a sequenced game structure conducive to the emergence of a stable 
signal-induced trust between the six parties.143 Transition from the first to 
second stage was conditional on the successful implementation of the first 
series of obligations.144 In each stage, a set of actions was assigned to the 
parties to be initiated at specific dates and carried through concurrently.145 
These actions included a bevy of positive obligations, such as: the elimination 
of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of 
goods; the establishment of a common customs tariff; freedom of movement 
for persons, services, and capital; a common policy in the sphere of agriculture 
and transport; a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not 
distorted; coordination of economic policies; a standardization of laws to allow 
the proper functioning of the common market; the creation of a European 
Social Fund; and the establishment of a European Investment Bank.146 
Even more crucially, however, in addition to the larger implementation 
timeline, these complex ongoing positive obligations created countless rounds 
of signaling. Each time a signatory observed any of its positive obligations 
under the treaty it created yet another signaling round between the parties. For 
instance, the adherence to common customs by member states is an ongoing 
positive action repeatedly occurring. This collection of positive obligations laid 
the crucial framework for signal-induced trust and thus for the emergence of a 
robust system of private order upon which further cooperative structures could 
be, and indeed were built. The Treaty of Rome laid the crucial foundations for 
the Schengen Treaty, the Maastricht Treaty, and eventually the Lisbon Treaty 
that established the European Union. The contention here is that the positive 
character of the obligations invoked by the Treaty of Rome was instrumental in 
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this successful legal evolution. Indeed, the European Union is perhaps the most 
sophisticated example of a large-scale system of private ordering in human 
history. 
Brief mention should be made here regarding the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), as the ECJ resembles, in many respects, an external coercive 
entity. This appearance, however, is misleading. The ECJ is not an external 
enforcement authority. The court can initiate proceedings against a member 
state for failing to meet its obligations (we are concerned here with the ability 
to hold member states to their obligations as opposed to individuals within 
those states).147 Yet up until as late as 1992, the ECJ’s enforcement powers 
were limited to merely issuing a declaration, the cost of noncompliance being 
merely reputational.148 It was only until after the Treaty of Maastricht that the 
ECJ was even able to impose financial penalties against recalcitrant 
members.149 Notwithstanding this, the ECJ lacks the ability to actually exert 
compliance by way of force.150 If a member state simply unilaterally refused to 
pay an imposed penalty, the European Union could do nothing but resort to the 
usual diplomatic devices.151 Theoretically, member states could even exploit 
their position as masters of the treaty to repeal the enforcement authority of the 
ECJ.152 Indeed, despite its appearance, the ECJ’s enforcement ability should 
not be confused with the authority of national courts over parties to a contract. 
They are not at all the same. The enforcement power of the ECJ is entirely 
predicated upon the continuing commitment of its member states to even 
recognize its authority. Without such recognition, the ECJ simply has no bona 
fide enforcement power. The coercive authority of the ECJ is “best considered 
an act of self-commitment and is intended to secure the credibility of [its 
member states’] mutual policy obligations.”153 It is an enforcement mechanism 
created by the participants themselves, and so is contingent upon the 
participants’ implicit consent. A closer analogy would be something akin to 
mediation. It is not an external coercive body in the true meaning of the word. 
Despite its name, the European Court of Justice should not be confused 
with the enforcement power of courts on a national level. The European Union 
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very much remains a system of private ordering in the sense that it has evolved 
in the absence of an external coercive authority able to instill compliance 
through force. 
G. Close Alliances and the Possibility of Exploiting Positive Obligations to 
Stimulate Private Ordering 
Cooperation that arises between close allies on the international stage is 
predicated primarily upon signal-induced trust. Signal-induced trust can 
produce more sophisticated forms of cooperation than threat-induced trust 
because the option of retaliation is not always available in many situations that 
could otherwise be opportunities for cooperation. Treaties are implicitly less 
stable when they rely only on basic threat-induced trust. Moreover, signal-
induced trust is far more conducive to law building because the parties need 
not proceed as guardedly. Treaties are analogous to contracts between 
individuals, and close allies sharing many treaties are comparable to 
individuals in successful long-term commercial relationships: initially their 
dealings are based on the threat of retaliation, and they must be cautious in 
dealing with each other, but over many dealings they gain confidence in the 
other party’s cooperative intentions. Many of the requirements of threat-
induced trust can be relaxed at this stage. Here we have the true foundational 
ingredients of robust private ordering—signal-induced trust. Close allies are in 
a better position to forge new legal order as the trust deficit poses far less of a 
destabilizing threat. Signal-induced trust can in this manner enable private 
order to flourish. 
Indeed, states sharing many treaties between them generate high levels of 
signal-induced trust. These agreements work together in a synergistic fashion. 
European Union member states, for instance, share such a high concentration 
of treaty interconnections that a very robust signal-induced trust exists between 
them, which infuses a powerful degree of stability into the legal order they 
create. The rational trust exhibited between close allies is predominantly 
signal-induced trust born from their multitude of treaties and successful 
cooperation games. From this durable foundation, international regimes may 
evolve and take root. Such regimes are paradigms of private order—legal order 
arising organically in the vacuum of an external authority. Treaty regimes are 
embryonic legal order flowering into resilient systems of private order. 
Countries forging cooperation through treaty are essentially the same as 
individuals establishing cooperation through contract. They require rational 
trust: first this may be threat-induced trust, but over time signal-induced trust 
can emerge, at which point private ordering can grow rapidly. In essence, close 
allies have been “doing business” with each other for a long time. 
The thesis also suggests the possibility of a kind of legal engineering: 
treaties may intentionally be drafted so as to incorporate positive obligations in 
order to enhance their ability to generate private order. Indeed, the idea that 
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positive obligations maximize the potential for self-sustaining private order 
suggests an obvious opportunity for those who may wish to intentionally give 
rise to such order. For the most part, treaties already have the constituent 
ingredients of private ordering—i.e., specificity, signaling, and iteration—and 
therefore possess the potential to sustain themselves without third-party 
enforcement just as contracts between commercial parties do. This helps 
explain how treaty law is able to successfully flourish in the absence of a 
central authority. However, this may be taken further: by incorporating as 
many positive obligations as possible, treaties may be intentionally crafted so 
as to exploit this dynamic. 
The implication of performance signaling theory in terms of treaties is 
clear: the more positive obligations the better. This insight has important 
implications for international law theory in general. Much study has been 
devoted to how legal order arises upon the international stage, notwithstanding 
the absence of enforcement mechanisms. In that it identifies a mechanistic 
underpinning that contributes to this emergence, performance-signaling theory 
may offer some unique explanatory potential in this regard. Indeed, much may 
be gleaned by conceptualizing public international law simply as an evolving 
system of private order. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article I have sought to explain the crucial role of ongoing positive 
obligations in giving rise to systems of private order and apply this to the 
growth of public international law. I gave this dynamic a name: performance-
signaling theory. The theory holds that where there is an abundance of ongoing 
positive obligations between specific parties, the possibility for private 
ordering rises substantially because it allows for clearer signaling, helping to 
generate trust. Trust that the other player will cooperate solves the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Trust can arise where the threat of retaliation negates the benefit 
from cheating (threat-induced trust), but trust can also arise from parties 
repeatedly signaling their cooperative intentions. In the case of this second 
form of trust (signal-induced trust), the distinction between positive and 
negative obligations is critical because it determines the ability to signal 
clearly. 
It is in fact a very intuitive point: the more two parties actively interact 
with one another the greater is the potential that a strong cooperative 
relationship will emerge upon which a system of stable rules can then 
develop—i.e., private ordering. We see this in the case of private individuals 
who frequently interact; it is true for commercial parties who have frequent 
dealings, and it is true even for state actors. Treaty-based law should be 
thought of as a form of contract-based private ordering, one able to emerge 
primarily because it assigns ongoing positive obligations between the 
participants. Public international law may be re-conceptualized as a system of 
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private ordering on a grand scale, propelled forward through the force of 
positive obligations. Treaties are essentially contracts between nations that 
allow private ordering to arise on an international level just as contracts do 
within long-term commercial relationships between individuals. Yet this 
insight should be obvious. After all, how else could legal order emerge on the 
international stage where there is no central coercive authority, but through the 
machinery of private order? 
 
 
